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Abstract We study an equilibrium model for the pricing of a defaultable zero coupon
bond issued by a firm in the framework of Back [2]. The market consists of a risk-
neutral informed agent, noise traders and a market maker who sets the price using
the total order. When the insider does not trade, the default time possesses a default
intensity in market’s view as in reduced-form credit risk models. However, we show
that, in the equilibrium, the modelling becomes structural in the sense that the default
time becomes the first time that some continuous observation process falls below a
certain barrier. Interestingly, the firm value is still not observable. We also establish
the no expected trade theorem that the insider’s trades are inconspicuous.
Keywords Default · structural models · reduced-form models · equilibrium · insider
trading · Bessel bridge
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1 Introduction
In the valuation of credit derivatives the key issue is the calculation of the probabilities
associated to the default event for which the product is written. There are essentially
two approaches in the literature to model the default probabilities: structural approach
and reduced-form approach. The structural approach dates back to Black and Scholes
[4] and Merton [19] while the reduced-form models originated with Jarrow and Turnbull
[14]. As argued by Jarrow and Protter [13] the difference between these two approaches
lies on the amount of information available to the modeler. Structural models assume
the modeler has the same information as the manager of the firm and, thus, has the
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2continuous knowledge of the firm’s assets and liabilities. In these models the default
time is modelled to be the first time that the firm’s value falls below a certain barrier.
Consequently, this approach might come up with a model, e.g. if the firm value is
assumed to be continuous, where the default time is predictable to the modeler. This
feature of the model makes the yield spreads on the defaultable bonds approach to zero
very quickly as one gets close to maturity. However, such behavior in the yield spreads
is not common in practice (see, e.g. [11]).
In contrast the reduced-form models in general take the default time as exogenous
and model the information available to the modeler. The modeler does not have the
full information that the manager of the firm possesses but only a subset generated
by the default process and several other related state variables. This approach was
originated by Jarrow and Turnbull [14] and there has been a considerable literature
on these models since then. In this respect one can mention the works of Jarrow and
Turnbull [15], Artzner and Delbaen [1], Duffie, et al. [10], Lando ([17], [18]) and Duffie
and Singleton [9] to name a few. The common characteristic of these models is that
there exists a default arrival intensity as a function of state variables and the default
process. This aspect of reduced form modelling excludes such abnormal behavior of
yield spreads as observed in the structural models. The existence of the default intensity
implies that, in mathematical terms, the default time is a totally inaccessible stopping
time1. Consequently, the default time cannot be anticipated by the market and comes
as a total surprise.
Although they seem conceptually different, one may pass from a structural model
to a reduced form model. One can do this by assuming that the market’s information
set is that of the manager plus some noise as in Duffie and Lando [7], or restricting
the information set of the market by assuming that the market only knows whether
the firm is in financial distress or not as in C¸etin, et al. [5]. The common feature of
the both models is that they start with a structural model to define the default time,
however, they are still able to come up with default intensities although the firm value
is assumed to be continuous. We will not elaborate further on the differences of these
two model but refer the reader to the recent works by Bielecki and Rutkowski [3],
Duffie and Singleton [8] and Jarrow and Protter [13].
In the model of Duffie and Lando [7] the market has imperfect information about the
default event due to the noisy and infrequent accounting data. Duffie and Lando assume
that managers/owners, who have the perfect information about firm value, is precluded
from trading in order to avoid complex equilibrium problems involving asymmetric
information. In this paper we address such asymmetric information problem in a market
for a defaultable bond. We suppose that the default time is exogenously given to the
market. However, there is one trader, that we call insider, who has an extra information
about the default time. The other two market participants are the noise traders who
trade for liquidity reasons and the market maker who clears the market given the total
demand. The insider is assumed to know the default time. The default event is obviously
predictable to the insider as is the case in the structural models with continuous firm
value, but it is totally inaccessible to the market maker when the insider doesn’t trade,
and it has an intensity, as in reduced form credit risk models. The market maker
chooses a pricing rule and the insider chooses a trading strategy where the cumulative
1 Default intensity could exist in a structural model if the firm value is allowed to jump,
see, e.g., Huang and Huang [12]; hence, the essential difference between the structural and the
reduced form models is the level of the information available to the market.
3demand of the noise traders is modelled by a Brownian motion. The equilibrium is
defined similar to that in Back [2]. We show that in the equilibrium the insider’s trades
cannot be seen in the market and the default time becomes the first time that the
continuous total order process falls below a certain barrier. Consequently, the model
becomes structural although the firm value is still not observable. We also show that
the equilibrium total order process is a Brownian motion in its own filtration, hence the
insider’s trades are inconspicuous, but a 3-dimensional Bessel bridge of length τ in the
insider’s view, where τ is the default time (see Theorem 3.6 for the precise statement).
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 solves
the equilibrium pricing rule and the demand for the defaultable bond while Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
A company issues a bond that pays 1 unit of a currency at time 1 unless it defaults be-
fore that time. We suppose that the defaultable bond’s recovery rate is 0 for simplicity.
The company’s default time is modelled by a random time τ defined on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P). The equilibrium framework of our model follows closely that of Back
[2]. We refer the reader to Back [2] for motivation and details that are not explained
in what follows. We suppose the default time is given by
τ := inf{t > 0 : Zt = −1}, (2.1)
where Z is a standard Brownian motion with Z0 = 0. It is well-known that
P[τ > 1|Zt] = 1[τ>t]F (t, Zt),
where
F (t, y) :=
∫ ∞
1−t
y + 1√
2pix3
e−
(y+1)2
2x dx. (2.2)
We may view Z as the value of the firm under a risk-neutral measure and −1 can be
considered as default barrier. More general forms for the firm’s value process can be
chosen. However, we retain this Brownian assumption for the firm’s value process for
transparency of our results.
Three types of agents act in this market:
1. The noise traders: as in Back’s model [2], they can only observe their own cumu-
lative demands and whether the default has happened or not. Their cumulative
demand is modelled by a standard Brownian motion B, with B0 = 0, whose com-
pleted natural filtration is denoted by FB = (FBt )t≥0 and independent of Z.
2. The informed trader: apart from observing continuously in time the defaultable
bond prices, the insider knows the default time, τ . We denote FI her filtration and
assume that she is risk-neutral, so that her objective is to maximize her expected
profit.
3. The market maker: the market maker observes the total order of the noise traders
and the insider and sets the price of the risky asset to clear the market.
We further suppose Z0 is known to the market maker and the insider at time 0.
4Insider’s objective. As in Back’s model [2], insider’s trading strategies, denoted with θ,
will be assumed to be absolutely continuous for optimality reasons so that dθt = αtdt,
where α is an FI -adapted process such that ∫ 10 |αt|dt <∞.
Being risk-neutral, the insider has the objective to maximize her expected wealth
at time 1. We suppose the default-free interest rate equals 0. Note that the value of
the zero-coupon bond to the insider equals 1[τ>1] all the time. Using this insight and
following the arguments leading to the wealth process of the insider in Back [2], we
find that
W θ1 =
∫ 1
0
(1[τ>1] − St)αtdt, (2.3)
where St denotes the market price of the defaultable bond at time t, which is assigned
by the market-maker. We will give the precise definition of admissible strategies for
the insider after explaining what a pricing rule is in this framework.
Market maker’s objective. The market maker sets the price of the defaultable bond
using his information set, which consists of two parts. The first component is the
total order of the noise traders and the insider, which is denoted with Y and has the
decomposition
Y = Y θ = Bτ + θτ ,
where θ is the position of the insider in the defaultable bond so that the total demand
right before the insider starts trading at time 0 equals 0. Note that we stop the market
at time τ so that there is no trading in the defaultable bond once the default has
occurred. We denote the minimal right continuous and complete filtration generated
by Y θ with FY , where we suppress the dependency on θ in the notation. The second
part of the market maker’s information comes from the observation of the default
event, i.e. the market maker also observes whether the default has happened or not.
In mathematical terminology, this makes τ a stopping time in his filtration. Therefore,
the market maker’s information is modelled by the filtration FM = (FMt )0≤t≤1 where
FMt := FYt ∨ σ(τ ∧ t).
LetDt = 1[τ>t] denote the indicator function of no-default by time t. The modelling
idea, as borrowed from Back [2], is that the market maker assigns the price looking at
the current total order and whether the default has happened. Thus, St denoting the
market price of the bond at time t, we expect
St = DtH(t, Yt),
where H : [0, 1] × R 7→ R is the pricing rule of the market maker. This justifies the
following definition:
Definition 2.1 A measurable function H : [0, 1]× R 7→ R is a pricing rule if
1. H ∈ C1,2([0, 1)× R) and H(1, ·) ≡ 12;
2. E[D1H(1, B1)] <∞ and E[
∫ 1
0 DtH(t, Bt)
2dt] <∞;
3. y 7→ H(t, y) is strictly increasing for every t ∈ [0, 1).
Moreover, let θ be a trading strategy of the insider. Given θ, a pricing rule H is
said to be rational if it satisfies
DtH(t, Yt) = E[1[τ>1]|FMt ], t ∈ [0, 1]. (2.4)
2 Note that these two conditions ensure that (H(t, Yt))t∈[0,1] is a semimartingale.
5Remark 2.2 Since the insider observes the price and the pricing rule is monotone over
[0,1) and B is continuous, the insider’s filtration, FI , is generated by B and τ . Since B
and τ are independent, B is also an FI -Brownian motion. Thus, the total order Y is
the sum of a FI -Brownian motion and an absolutely continuous FI -adapted process.
Now, a classical result in optimal filtering implies all FY -martingales are continuous
(see e.g. Corollary 8.10 in Sect. VI.8 of Rogers and Williams [20]).
We are now able to give the definitions of admissible trading strategies for the
insider, and equilibrium in this setting:
Definition 2.3 An insider’s admissible trading strategy is an FI -adapted process θ
such that
1. dθt = αtdt for α an FI -adapted process with E
∫ 1
0 |αt|dt <∞,
2. the corresponding total order Y θ is (in its own filtration) a Markov process given
τ ,
3. for every pricing rule H, one has
E
[∫ 1
0
DtH(Y
θ
t , t)
2dt
]
<∞.
The set of all admissible strategies is denoted with A.
The condition 3 above is set to rule out doubling strategies. For a more detailed
discussion of this condition, we refer the reader to Back [2].
Definition 2.4 A pair (H∗, θ∗) is said to form an equilibrium if H∗ is a pricing rule,
θ∗ ∈ A, and the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Market efficiency condition: given θ∗, H∗ is a rational pricing rule.
2. Insider optimality condition: given H∗, θ∗ solves the insider optimization problem:
W θ
∗
1 = sup
θ∈A
E[W θ1 |FI0 ].
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we will look for the existence of an equilibrium as defined in Definition
2.4. We’ll first address the optimality condition for the insider. Throughout this section,
we will use the standard notation [[0, τ ]] := {(ω, t) ∈ [0, 1]×Ω : τ(ω) ≥ t}. This is clearly
a measurable subset of (Ω × [0, 1],F ⊗ B([0, 1]), dPdt).
3.1 Optimality conditions for the insider’s problem
Let us fix a pricing rule H. Using (2.3) and noting that lims↑tH(s, Ys) = H(t, Yt) for
all t ∈ (0, 1), the insider’s problem becomes
sup
α∈A
E
[∫ 1−
0
{
1[τ>1] −Dt−H(t, Yt)
}
αtdt
∣∣∣∣∣FI0
]
(3.1)
6For a given strategy α, let us write for t < 1
J(t, Yt,1[τ>1]) = ess supα(t)∈A(t,α)E
[∫ 1∧τ
t∧τ
1[u<1]
{
1[τ>1] −H(u, Yu)
}
α
(t)
u du
∣∣∣∣∣FIt
]
,
where A(t, α) = {α(t) ∈ A : α(t)u = αu, 0 ≤ u ≤ t}, t ≥ 0, and define
J(1, Y1,1[τ>1]) := lim
t↑1
J(t, Yt,1[τ>1]).
Note that we are in a similar situation as in Back [2] (see also [6]). Using the arguments
therein, the solution to (3.1) exists if the following system has a solution:
∂
∂y
J(t ∧ τ, y,1[τ>1]) + 1[τ>1] −H(t ∧ τ, y) = 0, for t < 1, (3.2)
∂
∂t
J(t ∧ τ, y,1[τ>1]) +
1
2
∂2
∂y2
J(t ∧ τ, y,1[τ>1]) = 0, for t < 1. (3.3)
This implies that for any total order process Y , associated to an admissible strategy
of the insider, H satisfies
∂
∂t
H(t, Yt) +
1
2
∂2
∂y2
H(t, Yt) = 0, t ∈ [[0, τ ]] ∩ [0, 1). (3.4)
Although the dependency of J on 1[τ>1] is obvious, we’ll suppress this dependency in
the notation as long as no confusion arises.
Lemma 3.1 (Theorem 2, Back [2]) If a pricing rule H verifies equation (3.4), then
there exist a function J satisfying the system given by (3.2) and (3.3). Moreover, one
has
J(τ ∧ 1, Yτ∧1) ≥ 0, (3.5)
for all admissible Y and the equality holds if and only if Y satisfies limt↑1H(τ ∧
t, Yτ∧t) = 1[τ>1].
Proof Keeping in mind that τ ∧ 1 ∈ FI0 , we refer to Back [2] (Theorem 2, p. 396) or
Cho [6] (Lemmas 4, 5, p. 56).
In the sequel, a rational pricing rule H will be given. We will investigate what
properties an admissible insider strategy should satisfy in order to be optimal.
Proposition 3.2 Let H be a rational pricing rule and assume limt↑1H(τ ∧t, Yτ∧t) =
1[τ>1]. The following are equivalent:
1. H satisfies (3.4).
2. Inconspicuous insider trade theorem holds, i.e. E[αt|FMt ] = 0 dPdt-a.e. on [[0, τ ]].
3. Y stopped at τ is a Brownian motion for the market maker, more precisely there
exists an FM -Brownian motion BM such that Yt∧τ = BMt∧τ for every t ∈ [0, 1].
7Proof First, we prove that 1 and 2 are equivalent. Itoˆ’s formula applied to DtH(t, Yt)
gives, for t < 1,
dDtH(t, Yt) = Dt−
{
∂
∂t
H(t, Yt) +
1
2
∂2
∂y2
H(t, Yt)
}
dt
+Dt−
∂
∂y
H(t, Yt)dYt +H(t, Yt)dDt.
Therefore, letting H−(t, Yt) = lims↑tH(s, Ys) and ∂∂tH−(t, Yt) := lims↑t
∂
∂tH(s, Ys),
and defining ∂
2
∂y2
H−(t, Yt) and ∂∂yH−(t, Yt) analogously, we have the following decom-
position for DtH(t, Yt) on the whole interval [0, 1]:
dDtH(t, Yt) = Dt−
{
∂
∂t
H−(t, Yt) +
1
2
∂2
∂y2
H−(t, Yt)
}
dt+Dt−
∂
∂y
H−(t, Yt)dYt
+1[t=1]D1−(1−H−(1, Y1)) +H−(t, Yt)dDt
+ {H(t, Yt)−H−(t, Yt)} (Dt −Dt−)
= Dt−
{
∂
∂t
H−(t, Yt) +
1
2
∂2
∂y2
H−(t, Yt)
}
dt+Dt−
∂
∂y
H−(t, Yt)dYt
+H−(t, Yt)dDt + 1[t=1]D1(1−H−(1, Y1)). (3.6)
By standard filtering arguments it is not difficult to see that
Yt = B
M
t +
∫ t
0
α̂udu, t ∈ [0, 1], (3.7)
for an FM -Brownian motion BM and α̂t := E[αt|FMt ], t ∈ [0, 1]. To see this, consider
the process
Nt := E
[∫ t
0
αsds
∣∣∣∣FMt ]− ∫ t
0
α̂sds.
N is clearly an FM -martingale. As a consequence, we have that
Yt = E[Yt|FMt ] = E[Bt|FMt ] +Nt +
∫ t
0
α̂sds.
Now, we observe that Mt := E[Bt|FMt ] is an FM -martingale which follows from that
B is an FI -Brownian motion and FM ⊂ FI . Moreover, 〈Y 〉t = t. Thus, the continuous
martingale M + N having 〈M + N〉t = 〈Y 〉t = t is an FM -Brownian motion and we
get (3.7).
Using this result, we can rewrite the decomposition of DtH(t, Yt) as follows
dDtH(t, Yt) = Dt−
{
∂
∂t
H−(t, Yt) + α̂t
∂
∂y
H−(t, Yt) +
1
2
∂2
∂y2
H−(t, Yt)
}
dt
+Dt−
∂
∂y
H−(t, Yt)dBMt
+H−(t, Yt)dDt + 1[t=1]D1(1−H−(1, Y1)).
Under the assumption limt↑1H(τ∧t, Yτ∧t) = 1[τ>1], the last term in the above decom-
position of DtH(t, Yt) vanishes. Also note that
∫ t
0 H−(s, Ys)dDs = −H−(τ, Yτ )1[τ≤t],
8which equals, for t < 1,−H(τ, Yτ )1[τ≤t]. Observe that for u ∈ [t, 1), H(τ∧u, Yτ∧u)1[τ≤t] =
H(τ, Yτ )1[τ≤t]. Thus,
1[τ≤t] lim
u↑1
H(τ ∧ u, Yτ∧u) = 1[τ≤t]H(τ, Yτ ).
However, by hypotheses, limu↑1H(τ∧u, Yτ∧u) = 1[τ>1],which in turn impliesH(τ, Yτ )1[τ≤t] =
0 for t < 1. Taking limits we have H−(τ, Yτ )1[τ≤1] = 0, as well. Therefore,
dDtH(t, Yt) = Dt−
{
∂
∂t
H−(t, Yt) + α̂t
∂
∂y
H−(t, Yt) +
1
2
∂2
∂y2
H−(t, Yt)
}
dt
+Dt−
∂
∂y
H−(t, Yt)dBMt . (3.8)
Since H is rational, the process DtH(t, Yt) must be an FM -martingale. Of course, this
is the case if and only if the finite variation part in the above decomposition vanishes,
i.e., for t < 1,
∂H
∂t
(t, Yt) + α̂t
∂H
∂y
(t, Yt) +
1
2
∂2H
∂y2
(t, Yt) = 0 on [τ ≥ t].
This proves that 1 and 2 are equivalent since H is strictly increasing in the second
variable. It remains to show that 2 and 3 are equivalent. For this, it suffices to observe
that, in view of (3.7),
∫ t
0 α̂sds = 0 dPdt-a.e. on [[0, τ ]] if and only if Yt∧τ = B
M
t∧τ for
all t ∈ [0, 1].
The next lemma gives a necessary and sufficient condition for an admissible strategy
to be optimal given a rational pricing rule H.
Lemma 3.3 Given a rational pricing rule H, θ∗ ∈ A is an optimal insider strategy if
and only if it satisfies the following two properties:
1. E[α∗t |FMt ] = 0 dPdt-a.e. on [[0, τ ]], where α∗t = dθ
∗
dt ;
2. the corresponding optimal total order Y ∗ satisfies limt↑1H(τ ∧ t, Y ∗τ∧t) = 1[τ>1].
Proof Let H be a rational pricing rule. Suppose θ∗ is a corresponding optimal strategy
of the insider. HJB equations ((3.2) and (3.3)) require that H satisfies equation (3.4),
and by Lemma 3.1 there exists a function J satisfying the system given by (3.2) and
(3.3).
An application of Itoˆ’s formula for t < 1 gives, on the event [t < τ ] ∈ FI0 ,
J(τ ∧ 1, Yτ∧1) = J(t, y)−
∫ τ∧1
t
(1[τ>1] − Su)αudu−
∫ τ∧1
t
(1[τ>1] − Su)dBu.
Now, condition 3 of Definition 2.3 implies
∫ s
t (1[τ>1] − Su)dBu, t ≤ s ≤ 1, is an FI -
martingale so that
E
[∫ τ∧1
t
(1[τ>1] − Su)αudu
∣∣∣∣∣FIt
]
= J(t, Yt)− E[J(τ ∧ 1, Yτ∧1)|FIt ].
The expected future wealth reaches its maximum when E[J(τ ∧ 1, Yτ∧1)|FIt ] reaches
its minimum. In view of Lemma 3.1, E[J(τ ∧ 1, Yτ∧1)|FIt ] attains its minimum at
9Y ∗τ∧1 if and only if limt↑1H(τ ∧ t, Y ∗τ∧t) = 1[τ>1]. Thus, by Proposition 3.2, α∗ is
inconspicuous, i.e. E[α∗t |FMt ] = 0 dPdt-a.e. on [[0, τ ]].
To complete the proof it remains to show that if α∗ satisfies 1 and 2 then it is
optimal given H. Again by Proposition 3.2 one has that H solves (3.4). By Lemma 3.1
α∗ is optimal if and only if limt↑1H(τ ∧ t, Y ∗τ∧t) = 1[τ>1], Y ∗ being the total order
associated to α∗. This equality is satisfied thanks to property 2.
3.2 The equilibrium and its interpretation
The following lemma is essential in the characterization of the equilibrium.
Lemma 3.4 The couple (H∗, θ∗) is an equilibrium if and only if the following two
conditions hold:
1. H∗ solves (3.4),
2. Y ∗ is an FM -Brownian motion stopped at τ such that limt↑1H(τ ∧ t, Yτ∧t) =
1[τ>1].
Proof We prove first that if (H∗, θ∗) satisfies 1 and 2 then it is an equilibrium, i.e. H∗
is rational and θ∗ is an optimizer. Condition 2 implies that α̂∗t = 0 on [t ≤ τ ] (use
Proposition 3.2). Moreover, decomposition (3.8) together with Condition 1 gives that
DtH(t, Yt) is an FM -martingale, which implies that H∗ is rational.
Moreover, given H∗ satisfying the conditions in 1 and 2, θ∗ with the associated
total order process Y ∗ satisfying the conditions in 2 is optimal. Indeed, the optimality
of θ∗ is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 3.3.
To finish, it remains to show that if (H∗, θ∗) is an equilibrium then it satisfies
1 and 2. This comes from a combination of Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 3.3. Indeed,
θ∗ optimal given H∗ implies that the inconspicuous trade theorem holds and that
limt↑1H(τ ∧ t, Yτ∧t) = 1[τ>1]. so that, by Proposition 3.2, H∗ has to satisfy (3.4) and
Y ∗ is an FM -Brownian motion stopped at τ .
Before we show the existence of an equilibrium, we present the following technical
result.
Lemma 3.5 On the probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with the filtration FI = FB ∨
σ(τ), there exists a unique strong solution to the SDE
dYt = dBt +
{
1
1 + Yt
− 1 + Yt
τ − t
}
1[t≤τ ]dt , (3.9)
with Y0 = 0.
Proof The result follows as soon as one observes that conditioned on [τ = `], 1 + Y is
a 3-dimensional Bessel bridge of length ` starting at 1 at time 0 and ending at 0 at
time `, and that τ is independent of B. ¤
The following theorem is the main result of our paper. It gives the existence and
a characterization of the equilibrium. Moreover, it shows that in the equilibrium the
default time τ is a hitting time of the equilibrium total order process Y ∗ so that the
modelling changes to structural.
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Theorem 3.6 There exists an equilibrium (H∗, θ∗) such that
H∗(t, y) = F (t, y),
for t < 1 and H∗(1, ·) ≡ 1 where F is as defined in (2.2) and the equilibrium total
order Y ∗ solves
dYt = dBt +
{
1
1 + Yt
− 1 + Yt
τ − t
}
1[t≤τ ]dt . (3.10)
Therefore, given τ = `, 1 + Y is a 3-dimensional Bessel bridge of length ` starting at
1 at time 0 and ending at 0 at time `.
Moreover, one has τ = inf{t > 0 : Y ∗t = −1}. As a consequence, τ is a predictable
stopping time under the market maker’s filtration FM .
Proof It is straightforward to show that H∗ is a pricing rule satisfying (3.4). In view
of Lemma 3.4 it remains to show that the unique strong solution to the SDE in
(3.10), which exists by Lemma 3.5, is an FM -Brownian motion stopped at τ with
limt↑1H∗(τ ∧ t, Yτ∧t) = 1[τ>1]. In order to do so we’ll construct a Brownian motion
that is a weak solution to (3.10) by enlargement of filtration techniques. Observe that
this is the first time we use the assumption that the default time is given by the first
hitting of −1 by the firm value, Z. Let G be the filtration generated by FZ and τ ,
where FZ is the usual augmentation of Z. Then it readily follows from Jeulin [16]
(Lemme 3.25, p. 52) that Z has the following G-decomposition:
dZt = dβt +
(
1
1 + Zt
− 1 + Zt
τ − t
)
1[t≤τ ]dt
where β is a G-Brownian motion and so independent of G0 ⊇ σ(τ). Then, due to the
strong uniqueness of the solution as established in Lemma 3.5, Y ∗ has the same law as
Z; thus, Y ∗ is a Brownian motion in its own filtration. The uniqueness of the solution
implies also that
τ = inf{t > 0 : Y ∗t = −1}.
Thus τ is a stopping time with respect to FY ∗ and the filtrations FY ∗ and FM
coincide, so that Y ∗ is an FM -Brownian motion, too. To finish the proof it remains to
check limt↑1H∗(τ ∧ t, Y ∗τ∧t) = 1[τ>1]. We leave this simple task to the reader.
Now we turn to the interpretation of the equilibrium. It is easy to see that in the
equilibrium described in Theorem 3.6
1
1 + Y ∗t
= E
[
1 + Y ∗t
τ − t
∣∣∣FMt ] (3.11)
since α̂∗ = 0. This is an easy consequence of decomposition (3.10). Thus, conditional
on FMt , 11+Y ∗t is the best approximation in market’s view to the value
Y ∗t +1
τ−t . Recall
that the default will happen when Y ∗ hits −1. Therefore, Y ∗t + 1 can be viewed as
a metric measuring the distance to default. Moreover, τ − t is the time to default if
default has not happened by time t so that one can define the ratio
Y ∗t +1
τ−t as the true
speed of default. Due to the information structure the true speed of default is known
to the insider. However, the market maker has only an expectation of this speed given
his information. In view of (3.11) the market’s expectation for the speed of default
conditional on FMt is given by 1Y ∗t +1 .
11
Looking at (3.10), we see that the insider sells when the market’s expectation of
the speed of default is lower than the true speed and buys otherwise. This is quite
intuitive. Indeed, when the market’s expectation for the imminence of the default is
low, the bond is relatively overpriced, so the insider sells to increase her profits.
4 Conclusions
We have analyzed the effects of asymmetric information in defaultable bond pricing. In
an equilibrium setting a` la Back [2] we have shown that the information asymmetries
can change the nature of the modelling completely. We solved for the equilibrium
pricing rule for the market maker, optimal strategy for the insider and equilibrium
demand for the defaultable bond. It is shown that it is optimal for the insider to trade
without being seen while driving the total demand to hit a certain level at the default
time. The presence of a strategic insider turns the modelling into structural while the
model is reduced-form in the absence of the insider.
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